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ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Since under the requirement of the code the complaint must
state the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action, it is neces-
sary in an action on a contract to set forth "the contract and its
breach." This means that the plaintiff shall state consecutively the
facts showing the primary right-duty relationship between the plain-
tiff and the defendant-here arising from the agreement-and the
defendant's breach of his duty resulting in the secondary or remedial
right-duty relationship which the court is asked to recognize and
enforce in the action. Here, as elsewhere, it should be the aim of
the pleader to state so far as he can and so briefly as possible the
specific acts of the parties, what each did, rather than the legal
interpretation of these acts which he expects to ask the court to
make.'
Pleading the Contract-Effect of a Writing
Where the contract is oral, the meeting of the minds of the
parties in a definite promise must be shown by the allegations. It
has been held that the allegation that the parties "mutually agreed,"
etc. (stating the promise) is not objectionable as stating a conclusion
of law; in fact that it is the proper form rather than to allege what
* This article will form the substance of a chapter in a book on Code
Pleading, to be published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. It
supplements an article entitled "The Complaint in Code Pleading," 35 Yale
L. J. 259 (1926). Other articles to be incorporated in the proposed book are
History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 Va. L. R. 517 (1925), re-
printed in 5 Am. L. Sch. R. 716 (1926) ; The Union of Law and Equity, 25
Col. L. R. 1 (1924); Trial of Actions Under the Code, 11 Corn. L. Q. 482
(1926) ; The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L. J. 81 (1924) ; The Real Party
in Interest (with R. M. Hutchins), 34 Yale L. J. 259 (1925); Joinder and
Splitting of Causes of Action, 25 Mich. L. R. (Feb. 1927).
** Professor of Law, Yale School of Law, New Haven, Conn.
'The general idea of stating the facts constituting the cause in the com-
plaint, wherein it is always necessary to show facts from which at least the
secondary remedial right-duty relationship results, is developed in the writer's
article on the complaint, referred to in the star footnote above; and also the
article on the cause of action therein referred to.
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each said in making the agreement, which would be to state the
evidence.2
Where the contract is evidenced by a writing, under principles
of contract law, the whole contract must be found therein. Should
the detailed writing be considered the "fact" which must be alleged
as it exists; or should it be considered merely the evidence of the
legal agreement which alone should be alleged? There has been a
slight tendency for the courts to split on this issue; but the vast
majority hold that it is the pleader's option whether to plead the
contract according to its legal effect, or in ipsis verbis.8 This would
seem the better view, since the question is one of fair notice of the
contract and this may be given by either method. Pleading the legal
effect of the contract allows abbreviation but is subject to the danger
that the legal effect of the contract may be misstated and a variance
later be claimed; pleading the contract leads to exactness, but in the
case of a long instrument, to the cluttering of the record. In any
event, the matter should be subject to the control of the trial court,
which on a motion to make more definite can, where necessary,
require more exact notice.4
The common law rule,--perhaps only slightly modified by the
ideal of fair notice-was that the details of the contract must be set
out with particularity and that any variation between pleading and
proof was fatal.5
'Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 470, 100 N. E. 39 (1912). Allega-
tions as to What the parties said should be good except as against a motion,
provided they show a contract. See 35 Yale L. J. 264-266.
'Fairbanks v. Isham, 16 Wis. 118 (1862); Joseph v. Holt, 37 Calif. 250(1869); Frick v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. 98 Conn. 251, 119 Atl. 229 (1922);
Conn. Prac. Bk. (1922), sec. 181, p. 283; New York News Pub. Co. v. Steam-
ship Co.. 148 N. Y. 39, 42 N. E. 514 (1895); Sunderland's Cas. Code Pig.,
309 n. But see Reilly v. Cullen 159 Mo. 322, 60 S. W. 126 (1910); Estes v.
Desnoyers Shoe Co., 155 Mo. 577, 56 S. W. 316 (1900); cf. Kidder v. Port
Henry, 201 N. Y. 445, 94 N. E. 1070 (1911).
" Cf. Kidder v. Port Henry, supra. Statutes permitting the use of a copy
of an instrument for the payment of money, together with a mere allegation
of the amount due thereon, are cited, note 53, infra.
'Laing v. Fidgeon, 6 Taunton, 108 (1815); Curley v. Dean, 4 Conn. 259
(1822); Hill v. Barrett, 14 B. Mon. 83 (1853); Mazziotti v. Di Martino, 103
Conn. 491, 130 Atl. 844 (1925). See notes 11, 13, 26, infra. It was not neces-
sary, however, to allege irrelevant, immaterial or collateral promises. Mile's
v. Sheward, 8 East 7 (1806) ; Parker v. Palmer, 4 B. & Ald. 387 (1821). See
Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 107 N. Y. 61, 13 N. E. 592 (1887) that
an implied term of the contract must be pleaded.
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Statutes often require copies of written instruments made the
basis of claim or defense to be filed with the pleading.8 Often, too,
the denial of the execution of a writing, as alleged by the opposing
party, must be verified.7
Where the contract is within the statute of frauds, the existence
of a writing need not be alleged; though some courts have held that
a complaint showing that there was no writing in such case is demur-
rable, unless facts taking the case "out of the statute" are alleged.8
The Consideration
Since in all but a few cases consideration is necessary for the
existence of a valid contract, the consideration for the contract must
be alleged.9 In cases where "consideration is presumed," as in the
case of negotiable instruments, such allegation is not necessary.' 0
The common law rule was that the specific consideration must
be set forth and that the proof of any other consideration than that
alleged constituted a fatal variance.11 A question has been made
under the codes, however, whether the allegation that the contract
was made for "a valuable consideration" is not sufficiently specific.
On this point the lower New York courts divided until the Court of
'See e.g. statutes of Indiana, Burns Ann. St. 1924, sec. 368; Kansas, Rev.
St. 1923, 60-739; Ohio, Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 11, 333; Wisconsin, St. 1921, sec.
2675.
'See e.g. statutes of California, Code C. P. 1923, sec. 446-9; Indiana,
Burns. Ann. St. 1924, sec. 370; Kansas, R. S. 1923, 60-729; Missouri, Rev. St.
1919, sec. 1415.
'See Dorewta v. Powers, N. J. 115 Atl. 50 (1920), with note 69 U. of Pa.
L. R. 279; Harmon v. Alfred Peats Co., 214 N. Y. S. 353 (1925) (may be
raised by motion for judgment). But see Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie,
270 Pa. 221 Pa. 113 Atl. 202 (1921), Collins v. Oil Co., 125 S. E. 223 (1921),
with note 25 Col. L. R. 844; cf. Am. Products Co. v. Franklin Refining Co.,
295 Pa. 332, 119 Atl. 414 (1923). Cf. Lorenzen, 32 Yale. L. J. 311.
'Blanckenhagen v. Blundell, 2 B. & A. 417 (1819) ; Swift v. Fire Ins. Co.,
279 Mo. 606. 216 S. W. 935 (1919) ; Dec. Dig. Pleading, Sec. 8 (4) ; Contracts,
sec. 334.
" Pastene v. Pardini, 135 Calif. 431, 67 Pac. 681 (1902) ; Rector v. Fornier,
1 Mo. 204 (1822) ; Caples v. Branham, 20 Mo. 244 (1855). For the history
of the rule as to promissory notes, going back to the statute of 3 & 4 Anne. c.
9, see Carlos v. Fancourt, 5 D. & E. 482 (1794). But see Delano v. Bartlett,
6 Cush. 364 (1850). See 21 Mich. L. R. 697. As to contracts under seal, see
Montgomery v. Auckley, 92 Mo. 126 (1887); Considine v. Gallagher, 31 Wash.
669, 72 Pac. 469 (1903). Under statutes providing that written contracts
"import" consideration, no allegation of consideration is necessary. Globe etc.
Ins. Co. v. Heysley, 206 Ky. 202, 266 S. W. 1074 (1925); Brown v. Irving,
Mo. 269 S. W. 686 (1925).
' Lansing v. McKillip, 3 Caines, N. Y., 286 (1805) ; Curley v. Dean, 4 Conn.
259 (1822) ; Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309 (1882). As these cases
pointed out, it was necessary to allege the whole of the consideration.
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Appeals ruled that the allegation was sufficient.12 The decisions
elsewhere are conflicting, perhaps the majority favoring the older
rule.18
Performance of Conditions Precedent
Since at common law the contract must be set forth with par-
ticularity, the conditions to be performed by the plaintiff precedent
to the defendant's duty would appear as a part of such particular
obligations; and hence it became necessary to show performance of
such conditions or else no duty, and therefore no right of action, was
shown. The acts or events constituting such performance were to
be stated, a general allegation of performance being insufficient.14
In the absence of express code provisions, the same rule has been
applied in code pleading.15 The rule may be a burdensome one,
however, especially in cases where the conditions are very numer-
ous, as in the case of a contract of insurance, and the tendency has
been to relax the rule. Most codes, therefore, contain express pro-
visions permitting a general allegation of due performance of all
conditions precedent. 18 In some cases the rule has been modified by
' California Packing Co. v. Kelly, 228 N. Y. 49, 126 N. E. 269 (1920);
Brennan v. Standard Wood & Feed-Co., 211 N. Y. S. 649 (1925). See W. W.
Cook, 21 Col. L. Rev. 416; 35 Yale L. J. 263, 264. Cf. St. Lawrence Co. Nat.
Bank v. Watkins, 153 A. D. 551, 138 N. Y. S. 116 (1912) with White v. Wes-
tern Union Telegraph Co., 153 A. D. 684, 138 N. Y. S. 598 (1912).
' Leach v. Rhodes, 49 Ind. 291 (1874); Beck v. Odell, Ind. App. 127
N. E. 852 (1920) ; Anderson v. Charles, 52 Cal. App. 290, 198 Pac. 641 (1921)
(insufficient). But see Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed.) 562, 673; Patille v.
Jone,. 113 Ga. 330, 38 S. E. 745 (1901) ; Storseth v. Folsom, 45 Wash. 374, 88
Pac. 632 (1907). See Kean v. Mitchell, 13 Mich. 207 (1865) (good after ver-
dict) ; Bk. v. Ger. Ins. Co., 72 Wis. 535, 40 N. W. 506 (1880) (good v. general
demurrer). See cases collected Dec. Dig. P1. sec. 8 (4).
"Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East 500 (1811); Vivian v. Shipping, Croke,
Charles, 384 (1635) (good after verdict) ; Shipman on Com. L. Pl. (Ball. ed.)
246.
"Tooker v. Arnoux, 76 N. Y. 397 (1879) ; Root v. Childs, 68 Minn. 142,
70 N. W. 1087 (1897) ; Korbly v. Loomis, 172 Ind. 352, 88 N. E. 698 (1909) ;
Griffin v. Bass Foundry Co., 135 Ala. 490, 33 So. 177 (1902) ; California Can-
neries Co. v. Great Western Lumber Co., 44 Cal. App. 69, 185 Pac. 1008
(1919) ; Willey v. Cameron, Michel & Co., Inc., A. D., 217 N. Y. S. 248 (1926)
' See N. Y. C. P. A. Rule 92, from C. C. P. s. 533: "the party may state
in general terms, that he, or the person whom he represents, duly performed
all the conditions of such contract on his part." Cf. Alaska, Stat. 1913, sec.
910; Arizona, R. S. 1913, sec. 431; Arkansas, Dig. Stat. 1921, sec. 1227; Cali-
fornia, Code C. P. 1923, sec. 457; Colorado, Code 1921, sec. 72; Idaho, Comp.
Stat. 1919, sec. 6712; Iowa, Comp. Code, 1919, sec. 7267; Kansas, Rev, Stat.
1923, 60-743; Minnesota, G. S. 1913, sec. 7767; Missouri, R. S. 1919, sec. 1258;
Montana, Rev. Code, 1921, sec. 9170; "Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1922, sec. 8640;
Nevada, Rev. L. 1912, sec. 5071; New Mexico, Ann. St. 1915, sec. 4153; North
Carolina, Consol. St. 1919, sec. 539; North Dakota, Comp. L. 1913, sec. 7461;
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decisions. 17 In any event, the courts strive to construe conditions
as subsequent, where possible, since in such case non-performance
is considered matter of defense to be raised by the defendant.1 8
Whether a condition is precedent or subsequent involves a nice
question of interpretation of the contract.1 9 Since conditions pre-
cedent are so much disfavored, a condition which is merely precedent
to the accruing of the right of action is held not to come within the
rule; it must be precedent to the making of the contract rather than
its breach, i.e., it must be one which will be fulfilled, if at all, before
even a conditional duty of performance rests upon the defendant.
Some courts have seemingly made their decisions turn on this ques-
tion of time ;20 but this has not been decisive in many cases. In the
case of the ordinary bilateral contract, it must be decided further
whether the mutual promises are "dependent" or "independent"; if
the former, performance or readiness to perform by the plaintiff
must be shown before the defendant is in default.2 1 Further, it
Ohio, Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 11339; Oklahoma, Comp. Stat. 1921, sec. 301;
Oregon, Code C. P. 1920, sec. 88; Porto Rico, Rev. Stats. 1911, sec. 5111;
South Carolina, Code 1922, sec. 212; South Dakota, Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 2366;
Utah, Comp. L. 1917, sec. 6601; Washington, Rem. & Bal. Comp. Stat. 1922,
sec. 288; Wisconsin, Stat. 1921, sec. 2674; Wyoming, Comp. St. 1920, sec.
5681. The New York cases tend to hold strictly that the statutory language
must be followed. Berger v. Urban Motion Pictures Industries, Inc., 206 A. D.
379, 201 N. Y. S. 489 (1923) (that the plaintiff "duly performed all the terms
and obligations of said contract" is insufficient) ; Weinstein v. Ruthland Realty
Corp., 208 N. Y. S. 953 (1925) ; but see Murphy v. Hart, 122 A. D. 548, 107
N. Y. S. 542 (1907) ; 5 Minn. L. R. 147, citing cases from other jurisdictions.
Stating the details is still permissible. Moghabghab v. Sherman & Sons, Co.,
161 A. D. 135, 146 N. Y. S. 392 (1914) ; Korbly v. Loomis, 172 Ind. 352, 88
N. E. 69 (1909).
"' Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co., 86 Conn. 15, 84 AtI. 35 (1912) ; Vincent v.
Mutual Reserve Assoc., 77 Conn. 281, 287, 58 AtI. 963 (1904) (while plaintiff
suing on an insurance policy must prove performance of conditions precedent,
where in issue, yet defendant must raise the issue and plaintiff need not plead
performance).
'Johnson v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 117, 68 N. W. 868 (1896);
Jones v. Accident Ass'n., 92 Iowa, 652, 61 N. W. 485 (1854) ; Title Guaranty
& S. Co. v. Nichols, 224 U. S. 346, 32 Sup. Ct. 475 (1911). See 50 L. R. A.,
n.s., 1006 note.
" See Corbin's Anson on Contract, Ch. XIII, esp. p. 434: "Thus it is evi-
dent, in spite of very general assumptions to the contrary, that the burden of
allegation and the burden of proof cannot be determined by the test of such
descriptive adjectives as precedent and subsequent. It is no doubt true that the
law on this subject needs entire reconstruction and restatement, that there is
no existing test capable of logical definition, and that the rules are largely
arbitrary as well as conflicting." See also Corbin's Cas. on Contracts, 478-480,
702, et seq.
' Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co., supra note 17; Johnson v. Northwestern
Ins. Co., supra note 18.
' Corbin's Anson on Contracts, 435, 469-473.
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seems that even facts which it is agreed must exist at the time of
making the contract may not be considered as conditions precedent,
if the language of the defendant's promise is absolute and the further
requirements seem inserted by way of collateral provisos. A similar
question has arisen with reference to rights of action upon statutes.
The plaintiff must negative exceptions in the statute, but not provisos
which are only to be relied on by the defendant as matters of
defense. The distinction is largely one of position and wording.22
So in contracts the use of the terms exception and proviso in this
connection might be at least not as misleading as the labels precedent
and subsequent.23 The destinction is narrow but perhaps not unfair.
Where the very promise sued on is of limited scope (as 'to pay out
of money realized from the sale of a particular house),24 plaintiff
should show the facts were not outside the limitation; but where the
defendant, as in the insurance case, promises broadly and then with
excessive caution seeks to protect himself in the event of the happen-
ing of many contingencies which probably will not happen, he may
well be expected to assume the burden of raising the question.2-
It is generally, though not universally, held that proof of waiver
of performance of conditions is a fatal variance from allegations
of performance. The waiver itself must be pleaded.28
' See Comment, 5 Corn. L. Q. 199, discussing People v. Bradford, 227 N. Y.
45. 124 N. E. 118 (1919); 16 Col. L. R. 527; Barkei& . H. & St. J. R. R. Co.,
91 Mo. 86, 14 S. W. 280, (1886); Ansell v. Boston, Mass. 150 N. E. 166(1926) ; State v. Cohen, N. J. 131 Atl. 675 (1926).
' Cf. Lunt v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 149 N. E. 660 (Mass.-1925) ; Fike v.
Stratton. 174 Ala. 541, 558, 9, 56 So. 929 (1911) ; Lounsbury v. Protection Ins.
Co., 8 Conn. 459 (1831) ; Ferguson v. Cappeau, 6 Harr. & J. (Md.) 394 (1825);
Shipman on C. L. Pl'g (Ball. ed.) 250.
"As in Tooker v. Arnoux, supra note 15.
""It is well settled that in actions upon insurance policies containing a
stipulation that the policy shall be void if any of the representations of the
insured are untrue, the defendant must allege and prove the untruth of the par-
ticular representation claimed to be untrue." Ames, Cas. PI., 2d ed. 304, 305,
note, citing cases; Corbin's Cas. on Contracts, 709, note; 50 L. R. A., n.s.,
1006 note.
'Feder v. Midland Casualty Co., 316 Ill. 552, 147 N. E. 468 (1924);
Thompson v. St. Charles, 227 Mo. 220, 126 S. W. 1044 (1910) ; Garvey v.
Fowler, 4 Sandf. 665 (1851) ; Lumbert & Co. v. Palmer, 29 Iowa, 104 (1870) ;
Cavana.qh v. Iowa Beer Co., 136 Iowa, 236, 113 N. W. 856 (1907); Burgh v.
Legge, 5 M. & W. 418 (1839); Hind v. Oriental Products Co., 195 Cal. 655,
235 Pac. 438 (1925). Contra, Eq. Life Ass. Soc. v. Campbell, Ind. App.
148 N. E. 505 (1925) ; Traveller's Ins. Co. v. Fletcher Ann. Nat. Bk., Ind. App.
148 N. E. 501 (1925). Cf. Black Co. v. London G. & A. Co., Ltd., 190 A. D.
218, 180 N. Y. S. 74 (1919) with note, 5 Corn L. Q. 351; Harrison v. Bailey,
99 Mass. 620 (1868); Duffy Bros. v. Bing & Bing, A. D. 215 N. Y. S. 755
(1926); Towmv of Potsdam v. Aetna Cas. & Surety, A. D. 217 N. Y. S. 541
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The Breach
The acts of the defendant constituting the breach must be set
forth with definiteness and particularity. An allegation that the
defendant "failed to perform his contract," or breached it, is held
bad as being a conclusion of law.2 7  "The allegation of the breach
must obviously be governed by the nature of the stipulation. It
should be assigned in the words of the contract, either negatively
or affirmatively; or in words which are co-extensive with the
import and effect of it."28
Where the breach consists of the defendant's non-payment of
an obligation at maturity, a question of some difficulty has arisen.
This is due to the well settled rule of the codes that "payment is an
affirmative defense." The matter may be considered more at length
in connection with the answer where it may be suggested that a
logical and convenient distinction might be made between payment
at maturity of the obligation and payment later to obtain the release
of an already accrued right of action. On this theory plaintiff
should allege and prove non-payment at maturity, while the de-
fendant should allege and prove payment after the right has accrued.
This dictinction seems not to be applied generally, the burden being
placed on the defendant in both situations to allege and prove pay-
ment.29 Is it so then that the plaintiff need not allege non-payment
(1926). As these cases indicate, sometimes an exception is made in actions
on insurance policies, or on negotiable instruments where waiver of present-
ment is relied on. See Shipman, C. L. Pl., Ball. ed., 247-48, note. A case note
in 11 Corn. L. Q. 394 analyzes the cases and points out a distinction between
cases expressly alleging performance of conditions and those, such as where
the common counts are used, ignoring the conditions altogether. See also 20
Ill. R. 499 on the Feder Case, supra, 36 Yale L. J. 579.
' Crossways Apts. Corp. v. Amante, 210 N. Y. S. 346 (1925); Du Pont
Auto Distributors v. Du Pont Motors, 210 N. Y. S. 577 (1925) ; Shipman, C. L.
P1., Ball. ed. 252.
' Withers v. Knox, 4 Ala. 148 (1842) cit. Chitty; United Iron Works v.
Standard Brass Casting Co., Calif. 231 Pac. 567 (1925); Shering v. Kelley,
200 Mass. 232, 86 N. E. 293 (1908) ; Jones County v. Sales, 25 Iowa 25 (1868) ;
Sistare v. People's Supply Co., 87 S. C. 171, 69 S. E. 152 (1910) (assignment
should be sufficiently definite so that defendant may intelligently prepare his
defense) ; Shipman C. L. P1., Ball. ed. 251, 252. Under certain circumstances
the allegations must be more detailed than the language of the contract as
where the contract is ambiguous. Ibid.; Worthington v. McDonald, 4 Ind.
483 (1853). Cf. Jennings v. Kiernan, 35 Ore. 349, 55 Pac. 443 (1898) ; Shirk
v. Mitchell, 137 Ind. 185, 36 N. E. 850 (1893). Where a contingency must
happen before there is a breach, this must be alleged. See p. 104 supra; Talkorn
v. Wrigg, Croke Jac. 406 (1617).
' Alison Reppy, The Anomaly of Payment as an Affirmative Defense, 10
Corn. L. Q. 269 (1925); C. C. Alden, The Defense of Payment Under Code
Procedure, 19 Yale L. J. 647; 1 Minn. L. R. 462; 3 N. Y. Law R. 89; 2 Ibid.
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at maturity? While this would mean that the complaint would not
show a complete right of action on its face, some courts have
answered in the affirmative.30 Probably the majority meet the
dilemma by saying that the complaint is demurrable if non-payment
is not alleged; but where alleged, it need not be proved.81
Except where nominal damages only are sought, or where the
amount of damages has been liquidated by agreement of the parties,
the damage resulting to the plaintiff must be set forth. The method
of alleging damages is discussed hereinafter.82
ACTIONS FOR DEBTS OR ACCOUNTS DUE-THE COMMON COUNTS
At Common Law
A common law declaration in the action of debt contains a state-
ment of the amount of the indebtedness, together with the grounds
thereof, and, where based upon the defendant's promise, an alle-
gation of the promise, and further, the failure of the defendant to
pay the indebtedness.83 For interesting historical reasons involving
the availability of a new form of remedy-trial by jury-the action
in general assumpsit came largely to supersede the action of debt.8 4
In the action of general assumpsit, which was originally developed,
as was special assumpsit, from the old action of trespass on the
case, the assumpsit or promise was an important element. In gen-
eral assumpsit four counts were in ordinary use,--the indebitatus
30Archambeault v. Jamille, 100 Conn. 692, 124 At. 820 (1924) ; Morehouse
v. Throckinorton, 72 Conn. 449, 452, 44 Atl. 747 (1899) ; First Nat[. Bank v.
Strait, 71 Minn. 69, 75, 73 N. W. 645 (1898) ; Montgomery v. Lonifer, 94 Minn.
133, 102 N. W. 367 (1905); Rossiter v. Schultz, 62 Wis. 655, 22 N. W. 839
(1885) ; 16 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 104, 178. In the first four cases the statement was
dicta; the allegation was made.
' Lent v. N. Y. & M. R. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 504, 29 N. )E. 988 (1892) ; Lappin
v. Martin. 71 Mont. 233, 228 Pac. 763 (1924) ; Harrod v. Wineman, 146 Iowa,
718. 125 N. W. 812 (1910) ; Mahne v. Ruffino, 129 Cal. 514, 62 Pac. 93 (1900) ;
Jenkins v. Sullivan, 110 Md. 539, 73 Atl. 264 (1909) ; Wheeler & Wilson Co.
v. Worrale, 80 Ind. 297 (1881); Reppy, 10 Corn. L. Q. 269, 295-297, 301, 1
Minn. L. R. 46. In Montana, by perhaps the more logical rule, the allegation
must be proven. Young v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 42 Mont. 342, 112 Pac. 533
(1910).
See Morwitz v. De Bar, 61 Colo. 363, 157 Pac. 1163 (1916) and p. infra.
3,2 Chitty, Pleading, 13th Am. ed. 385, et seq.; Shipman, C. L. PI., Ball. ed.
132; The Lady Shandois v. Simson, Cro. Eliz. 880 (1602) ; Raborg v. Peyton,
2 Wheat. 385 (1817). An acknowledgment of indebtedness was sufficient to
show the obligation. Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218 (1836). A greater par-
ticularity was required than in the action of indebitattrs assumpsit. Ames, Lec-
tures, Leg. Hist. 53.
4 Ames. Lectures, Leg. Hist. VIII, XIV; Holdsworth, 3 Hist. Eng. Law,
3d ed. 412-454; 6 ibid. 639; Pt. II, c. 3, p.
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count, the quantum meruit count, the quantum valebat count, and
the count on account stated. The indebitatus count, which was the
more inclusive and more generally used, recited an indebtedness to
the plaintiff in a specified sum; then the consideration, which might
take a variety of well-known forms of expression, such as goods
sold and delivered, work done and labor performed, money had and
received, etc.; followed by an allegation that the defendant had
promised to pay the amount in question to the plaintiff, and a further
allegation that the defendant had disregarded his promise and had
not paid the indebtedness. The quantum meruit count was similar,
except that it was used for work done and labor performed and
alleged that the defendant promised to pay the reasonable value of
the same instead of a specific amount. So in the quantum valebat
count used for the sale of goods, the allegation was of a promise
to pay the reasonable value rather than a specific sum. Since it was
held that the indebitatus count could be used where an exact sum was
alleged, even though the proof showed a promise to pay the reason-
able value, the indebitatus count operated as a substitute for the two
quantum meruit and quantum valebat counts. The count on account
stated was employed very generally at common law as an additional
count following others, since it relied on an agreement between
plaintiff and defendant of acknowledgment of the latter that a cer-
tain amount was due. Hence the plaintiff would customarily add to
his declaration a count of this type in the hope that the proof might
show such an acknowledgment of a balance due and reliance could
in that event be had upon that count alone. If no such agreement
or accounting was shown, of course the count would drop out. Since
in each case the gist of the action was an assumpsit, it was necessary
to allege a promise by the defendant, even though the proof would
show a promise implied in law. 35 And since a promise implied in
law was sufficient for a general assumpsit, the common law came to
allow the use of the indebitatus count for money had and receivect
in a wide variety of claims involving generally the field of law which
we now term that of "quasi-contracts." Thus the indebitatus count
might be used for the recovery of money fraudulently obtained from
the plaintiff. And again, it might be used where the plaintiff "waived
the tort and sued in assumpsit" where there had been a conversion
of personal property from him. Hence it often resulted that a
"Ames, Lectures, Leg. Hist. XIII; 2 Harv. L. R. 1, 53; Henry, 26 Yale
L. J. 664; Shipman, C. L. P1., Ball. ed. 148.
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plaintiff would declare upon an indebtedness of a defendant to him
for money had and received, which indebtedness the defendant had
promised to pay to him but had failed to do, and would then show
at the trial that the defendant actually had made no promise other
than that implied by law from a conversion of the plaintiff's chattels
and a sale and receipt of money therefor.8 6 In other words, there
was developed at the common law a brief and summary form of
statement of an indebtedness which it is true showed the ground of
the debt, but often showed it no further than the somewhat general
phrase "for money had and received," a phrase covering a variety
of situations where in law the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff.
Under the Code
With the abolition of the forms of action the question was im-
mediately raised whether the summary form of statement in use in
general assumpsit could be likewise employed with the same broad
scope as at common law. Many early commentators strenuously
opposed this on the ground that the code required the pleading of
the facts of each cause of action and that the old common counts
in general assumpsit did not really set forth the facts but tended in
reality to conceal them. This was, so it was claimed, especially true
in the case of the quasi-contractual remedies. Among the strenuous
.advocates of this line of thought was Mr. Pomeroy, who, in his
belief that the "dry naked actual facts" alone should be stated, was
quite clear that the use of the common counts was a violation of the
spirit of the code.87 His views, so strongly put forth and supported
'by other textwriters, influenced certain of the courts who argued
.against the use of the common counts under the code.88 But the
-common counts were apparently too well and favorably known and
too convenient a form of pleading to succumb to this strenuous
:attack, for in probably all jurisdictions the use of the common
counts, at least for an indebtedness incurred with the defendant's
"Ames. Lectures, Leg. Hist. XIV; Martin, Civil Procedure, 355-58; Slade
-v. Morley, 4 Coke 92 b (1603) ; Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1010 (1760).
"Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 4th ed. s. 436-438. See also Kerr, P1. & Prac.
in the Western States, sec. 26; Note, 57 Am. Dec. 544; 3 Cor. L. Q. 145.
" For criticisms in the cases, see Thomson v. Elton, 109 Wis. 589, 85 N. W.
425 (1901); Bowen v. ERmnerson, 3 Ore. 452 (1869); Forster v. Kirkpatrick,
2 Minn. 210; Pioneer Fuel Co. v. Hager, 57 Minn. 76, 57 N. W. 828 (1894).
Cf. Abadie v. Cerrillo, 32 Cal. 172 (1867). The objections seem not to have
prevailed even in the states where uttered. See note 39 infra.
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consent, is well settled.8 9 It will be perceived that in this case at
least there is no misstatement, for the complaint alleges the amount
of indebtedness and the cause thereof but alleges it in very general
and summary form. In view of the fact that actions for a debt due
are usually summary in nature, involving the collection of a claim, it
would seem convenient to use such a brief form. The objection is
the generality of the allegation, but it would seem that for practical
purposes the allegation is sufficiently definite. A question has arisen
in some of the cases whether it is necessary longer to allege the
defendant's promise where the other facts in the complaint would
show that such promise is implied. One commentator has urged that
the only real objection to the common counts under the code is the
general tendency to omit the prormse, and hence, not to bring it
within the common law definition of a count in assumpsit.40 This,
it is submitted, is not to state the real objection as it is thought to be
a sound conclusion that the promise, where definitely implied from
the other facts stated, may be omitted as the conclusion which is to
be drawn by the court.41 Yet, as there may often be doubt whether
the court will surely draw the conclusion from the facts stated, the
more careful pleader will tend to guard himself against all difficulty
by inserting a definite allegation of the defendant's promise.4 2
May this summary form of statement be used in cases where the
tort is waived and the amount is claimed as an indebtedness due?
The objection here made is that the facts are not stated but con-
cealed. This objection, however, is based upon a supposed absolute
distinction between facts and law. Under this view the acts of the
See Kerr, op. cit., note 37, that it is permitted in practically every code
state. Cf. Speck v. Kramer, Ind. 151 N. E. 37 (1926). See discussion Weber
v. Lewis, 19 N. D. 473, 126 N. W. 105, 34 L. R. A., n.s., 364, note (1910) ; 35
Yale L. J. 273; 32 Yale L. J. 485; 7 Ibid. 197, and in authorities cited note 37
supra. Some statutes require the filing of a written instrument or account
made the foundation of suit. See statutes cited, note 6 supra, and see also
notes 52, 53, infra. A bill of particulars is often used in connection with the
common counts. See discussion below.
"34 L. R. A., n. s., 364. Cf. L. R. A. 1918 F. 437.
"Wilkins v. Stidger, 22 Cal. 232 (1863) ; Farren v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227
(1858); Higgins v. Germaine, 1 Mont. 230. Contra, Railroad Co. v. Kimmel,
58 Mo. 83 (1874); Tripp v. Park St. Motor Corp., 122 Me. 59, 118 Atl. 793
(1922); Kilpatrick-Koch Dry-Goods Co. v. Box, 13 Utah 494, 45 Pac. 629
(1896). Cf. Lumpkin, Jr., in Tuggle, Admin. v: Wilkinson, 12 Ga. 90 (1885) ;
"This writ, tested by the Common Law Forms, wants only the super se assump-
sit, and who cares a fig for that?"
"See Bowen v. Emmerson, 3 Ore. 452 (1869) and Conrad Natt. Bk. v. Great
Northern Ry., 24 Mont. 178, 61 Pac. 1 (1900) as examples of cases where the
court was slow to imply a promise to pay.
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defendant in converting the plaintiff's chattel would be considered
the facts and the statement that the defendant owes the plaintiff
money would be treated as law and not a sufficient allegation of the
facts. But, as pointed out in the writer's article on "The Complaint,"
there is no such arbitrary distinction between facts and law. Any
selection of facts by a plaintiff to prove a case involves a selection
according to the legal effect which he hopes to prove. The stating
of the facts of a cause of action, in other words, is really the select-
ing from a mass of data covering the relationship between plaintiff
and defendant those which are favorable to the plaintiff's case, and
the interpretation of them in the light of the law which will show a
recovery. The difference between facts and conclusions of law is
therefore simply a more or less convenient difference of degree. 48
On this analysis one is not departing from the code ideal of pleading
facts when he puts the legal interpretation upon the facts which he
sets forth, as where he says that the defendant is indebted to the
plaintiff for so many dollars for money had and received. Here
again, the real objection is that the statement involves a broad gen-
.eralization, a generalization which depends for the notice that it
shall give to the other party partly upon the other party's knowledge
of the law. This, however, is true in case of any pleading, only it is
perhaps somewhat more striking in the present case. The question
is one of degree of particularity required and convenience in the use
of the more general form. In view of the history and the con-
venience which has seemed to result from the use of this general
form and also that the inconvenience does not seem from the cases
to have been very manifest, it is not thought objectionable to use this
form of pleading. Probably the majority of cases under the code
allow it to be used even in the quasi-contractual cases.
44
"' See The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Yale L. J. 259-268.
" Grannis v. Hooker, 29 Wis. 65 (1871) ; Knapp v. Walker, 73 Conn. 459, 47
Atl. 655 (1900) ; Minor v. Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 55 Pac. 783 (1898) ; Clifford
Banking Co. v. Donovan Commission Co., 195 Mo. 262, 94 S. W. 527 (1905) ;
Walker v. Duncan. 68 Wis. 624 (1887) ; Markermare Co., Inc. v. Alper, 210
A. D. 389, 206 N. Y. S. 233 (1924). Contra, Moser v. Pugh-Jenkins Furniture
Co., 31 Idaho, 438, 173 Pac. 639, L. R. A. 1918 F. 437, with note; Truro v.
Passmore, 38 Mont. 544, 100 Pac. 966 (1909) ; Buchanan v. Black, 15 Ore. 563,
16 Pac. 422 (1888). The common counts are not appropriate for an action for
breach of conditions of a penal bond. Gallup v. Jeff ery, 86 Conn. 308, 85 At.
374 (1912) ; or against an indorser on a note, Worley v. Johnson, 60 Fla. 294,
53 So. 543, 33 L. R. A., n. s,. 639 (1910) ; or to settle a partnership, Lakitsch
Admr. v. Brand, 99 Conn. 388, 121 Atl. 865 (1923); or on a promise other
than to pay money, Ogden v. Rubin, 7 Fed. (2d) 1007 (1925). In Connecticut
the common counts must follow a standard form covering nine different alle-
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A general allegation that a certain amount is due or that the
defendant is indebted in a certain amount with no further specifica-
tion of reasons is generally held too indefinite under the code.45
At common law the allegation of the defendant's breach, that is,
non-payment, was necessary.46 As already pointed out in connection
with special contracts, the code rule is in general the same though
there may be some doubt whether the plaintiff must prove this
allegation. 47
Variance
The question of variance has been most important -in this con-
nection where either a special contract was alleged and a general
indebtedness proven, or a general indebtedness alleged and only a
breach of an executory contract shown. From a comparatively early
date it has been settled that the common counts would lie for money
due on performance of a contract.48 On the other hand, where the
claim was merely for damages for breach of an executory contract,
the common counts were not available.49 Hence, it has been neces-
gations of the ground of indebtedness, and thereafter a bill of particulars must
be filed showing the exact ground relied on. Conn. G. S. 1918, S. 5651; Conn.
Prac. Bk. 1922, p. 279, 289, 358. The plaintiff cannot waive the tort of con-
verting personal property, unless the defendant has sold the property. Ibid., p.
280. On the necessity of a sale generally,* see Corbin, Waiver of Tort and
Suit in Assumpsit, 19 Yale L. J. 221, 229; Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, s. 273.
" See 35 Yale L. J. 263, note 24; cases collected, Dec. Dig. P1. sec. 8 (5).
Cf. Sparks v. Ducos, 123 A. D. 507, 108 N. Y. S. 546 (1908) with Gillespie
Bros. v. Page, 87 S. C. 82, 68 S. E. 1044 (1910) ; Kilpatrick Koch Co. v. Box,
note 41 supra with Christensen v. Crane, 156 Cal. 633, 105 Pac. 950 (1909).
See also Bowen v. Ernmerson, 3 Ore. 452 (1869), which erroneously criticises
Allen v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476 (1852), where the consideration was stated;
Chesney v. Chesney 33 Utah 503, 94 Pac. 989 (1908) ; but see Gillespie Bros.
v. Page 87 S. C. 82, 68 S. E. 1044 (1910). On account stated, see note 29
L. R. A. n. s., 334.
" Yong Don v. Hitchcock, 11 Hawaii, 270 (1898) ; Shipman, C. L. Pl., Ball.
ed. 258.
4? See discussion, supra, p. 107. Where the allegation is of a balance due on
account it has been held that the plaintiff must prove the allegation. Quinn v.
Loyd, 41 N. Y. 349 (1869).
" N. Y. News Co. v. National Steamship Co.. 148 N. Y. 39, 42 N. E. 514
(1895); Farron v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227; Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co. v.
Cheeney, 89 Conn. 714, 95 Atl. 5 (1915) ; Gilman v. Cross, Ohio, 151 N. E.
782 (1925) ; Elliott v. Wilson, 2 Boyce, Del. 445, 80 Atl. 35 (1911) ; McKinnie
v. Lane, 230 I1. 544, 82 N. E. 878 (1907) ; Wilcox v. Nennan, 58 Mont. 54,
190 Pac. 138 (1925); Douglas v. Brandt, 99 Conn. 161, 121 Atl. 179 (1923);
Heitz v. Sayres, 31 Del. 221, 113 A. 901 (1923). But see U. S. Rubber Co. v.
Grigsby, 113 Neb. 695, 204 N. W. 817 (1925) criticised in 24 Mich. L. P. 313.
" Mankin v. Jones, 68 W. Va. 422, 69 S. E. 981 (1910) ; Meyer v. Frenkel,
113 Md. 36, 77 Atl. 369; Cook v. Dade, 191 Mich. 561, 158 N. W. 175 (1916) ;
Expanded Metal Fireproofing Co. v. Boyce, 233 Ill. 284, 84 N. E. 275 (1908).
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sary to distinguish between the cases where merely damages are due
for breach of contract and the cases where an indebtedness is due
on completion of the contract. In this connection arise certain inter-
esting questions of substantive law, as, for example, whether and
under what circumstances a plaintiff who has not fully performed
may recover the amount due him under the contract.50 But when
these questions are solved and it is seen that either claims for dam-
ages should have been used in place of the common counts, or vice
versa, the next question is whether the evidence at the trial is inad-
missible without a change in the pleading,--that is, whether there is
a variance. Many cases hold in such case that a material variance
exists, but several recent cases have suggested that the shift in posi-
tion of the plaintiff is, under the facts alleged, immaterial. 51
Pleading Accounts or Written Instruments Under Statute
Many codes provide for simple pleadings in the case of account
and in the case of written obligations for the payment of money only.
Thus it is not unusual to provide that it is not necessary for a party
to set forth in a pleading the items of an account alleged in it, but
in such case, it is usually stated that he must furnish within a
certain period after written demand a true copy of the items of
account. In other words the individual items are not set up unless
the defendant requires it.52 So where a cause of action is founded
'See discussion in Martin, Civil Prac. 341-349; Shipman, C. L. PI., Ball.
ed. 153-160.
"'From implied to proof of express contract a variance; Glass v. Misroch,
206 N. Y. S. 373 (1924) modified on another point, 239 N. Y. 418, 147 N. E. 71
(1925) ; Expanded Metal Fireproofing Co. v. Boyce, note 49 supra. Contra,
Franklin Bk. v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., Ind. App. 147 N. E. 722 (1925) ; Scan-'
lan v. Gill & Sons Co., 166 N. Y. S. 742 (1917), criticised in 3 Corn. L. Q.
145. Cf. cases note 48, supra. Cf. Berkshire Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Cohen, 236
N. Y. 364, 140 N. E. 726 (1923), allegation of goods sold and delivered; re-
covery allowed on showing that title had passed although there was no delivery;
approved 24 Col. L. R. 97; Mazziotti v. Di Martino, 103 Conn. 491, 130 Ati.
844 (1925). Note in 11 Corn. L. Q. 394. From express contract to proof as
on a quantum meruit, no variance; Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C. 394, 10 S. E.
566 (1899) ; contra, Rockwell Stock & Land Co. 7. Cestroni, 6 Colo. App. 528,
42 Pac. 182, 42 Cant. L. J. 31 (1895).
m N. Y. C. P. A., S. 246. Cf. ibid., S. 255 A (items of claim in action for
the sale and delivery of goods). Alaska, St. 1913, S. 906; Arizona, R. L. 1913,
S. 421; California, Code C. P. 1923, S. 454; Colorado, Code C. P. 1921, S. 69;
Idaho, Comp. St. 1919, S. 6709; Rev. Stat. 1923, 60-740; Minnesota, Rev. St.
1923, S. 9274; Missouri Rev. St. 1919, S. 1258; Montana, Rev. Code, 1921, S.
9167; Nebraska, Comp. St. 1923; S. 8641; New Mexico, Ann. St. 1915, S. 4149;
North Dakota, Comp. L. 1913, S. 7457; North Carolina, Consol. St. 1919, S.
534; Oklahoma, Comp. St. 1921; S. 302; Oregon, Code C. P. 1920, S. 84;
Porto Rico, St. 1912, S. 5108; South Carolina, Code, 1922, S. 419; South Da-
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upon an instrument for the payment of money only, it is provided
in some codes that the party may set forth a copy of the instrument
and state merely that there is due to him thereon from the adverse
party a specified sum which he claims, such an allegation being
equivalent to setting forth the instrument according to its legal
effect." In still other codes, provision is made for a short and
summary procedure to secure a judgment in this class of cases.54
AcTIoNs FOR DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENCE
The Defendant's Breach of Duty
Pleading in negligence actions follows in general the same form
as the old declarations in actions of trespass on the case which would
seem proper models for our modern complaint in these actions. In
accordance with the rules we have already discussed, it is not proper
for the plaintiff to allege that due to the defendant's negligence, he
was injured in a certain fashion. That is the conclusion he is asking
the court to draw and he must go at least one step farther back in
his allegation. Hence, it is the usual rule that the complaint must
show the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, his breach thereof, and
the injury which results from such breach to the plaintiff, together
with the resulting damage. In the general discussion of the com-
plaint numerous examples were cited from negligence actions
Reference is made to this discussion.5 5 Here it may suffice to point
kota, Rev. Code, 1919, S. 2362; Utah, Comp. L. 1917, S. 6598; Washington,
Rem. Comp. St. 1922, S. 284; Wisconsin, St. 1921, S. 2672; Wyoming, Comp.
St. 1920, S. 5676. See also note 6 supra.
" N. Y. C. P. A., rule 94; Ariz. Dig. Stat. 1921, S. 1222; Kansas Rev.
Stat. 1923, 60-740; Montana, Rev. Code, 1921, S. 9171, 2; Missouri, Rev. St. 1919
S. 1270; Nevada, R. L. 1912, S. 5068; Nebraska, Comp. St. 1922, S. 8641;
North Carolina, Consol. St., S. 540; Oklahoma, Comp. St. 1921, S. 302; Ohio,
Gen. Code, 1921, S. 11334; Washington, Rem. Comp. St. 1922, S. 284; Wis-
consin, St. 1921, S. 2675; Wyoming Comp. St. 1920, S. 5676. See also p. 101
supra that pleading of a written instrument in ipsis verbis is generally per-
mitted. The statute does not apply where the defendant's obligations is condi-
tional. Tooker v. Arnoux, 76 N. Y. 397 (1879) ; State v. Collins, 82 Ohio St.
240, 92 N. E. 439 (1910). The copy of the instrument must be complete; fail-
ure to include the endorsements on a note in an action against the endorser has
been held a fatal defect; Cosmopolitan Bank v. Blumberg, 215 N. Y. S. 436
(1926), but this has been reversed on appeal. 218 N. Y. S. 465 (1926).
"See. e.g., Arkansas, Dig. St. 1921, S. 1233 (in an action on written obliga-
tion, plaintiff may file affidavit of merits, whereupon defendant cannot answer
without an affidavit that he has a good defense; with a penalty by way .of
costs). See also the motion for summary judgment in New York, C. P. A.
rule 113.
"35 Yale L. J. 264-269.
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out that it is necessary to set forth with reasonable clearness and
definiteness the facts which are relied on as showing the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff. If the court can easily see such duty, as would
be the case in various circumstances, such as where the defendant
drives his automobile upon the plaintiff, it is not necessary to specify
in detail. But where such duty is not clear, as, for example, where
a workman is upon a railroad track and struck by a train, the facts
must be set forth. 56 Further, it is necessary to give sufficient details
so that the court may itself be convinced that the duty arose and not
be compelled to rely on the mere statement that there was a legal
duty.57 It is then necessary to state the facts which are relied upon
as being the defendant's breach of duty and to show how they cause
the resulting injury to the plaintiff.58 A very common error is made
by stating the defendant's wrongful act and the injury to the plaintiff
but not the connection between the two. This renders the complaint
demurrable for failure to state a cause of action.5 9 Since the plain-
tiff's injury is a necessary fact in any showing of negligence, that
must be set forth and the resulting damage to the plaintiff must be
set forth in accordance with the usual rules governing allegations of
damage.6 0 Furthermore, if there are any conditions precedent to
the defendant's primary or secondary duty, performance of these
must be shown. 61
In practice it seems quite usual and convenient to show the de-
fendant's primary duty to the plaintiff by showing first, the plaintiff's
position just prior to the accident, and second, the defendant's posi-
tion prior thereto and then the steps leading to the accident. Thus,
See Chicago & Erie R. Co. v. Lain, 170 Ind. 84, 83 N. E. 632 (1907) and
discussion 35 Yale L. J. 268-269. Cf. Valin v. Jewell, 88 Conn. 151, 90 Aft. 36(1914) ; Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Potter, Ohio 150 N. E. 44 (1925).
" Thus in Field v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 76 Mo. 614 (1882), in a complaint
for negligence for failing to keep open drainage ditches, the court's holding that
no duty on the part of the defendant was shown goes back to its conception of
the substantive law of surface water drainage. Cf. Seymour v. Maddox, 16Q. B. 326 (1851) (no duty to light the rear of a theatre for an actor) ; Minnelli
v. Marotta, 208 N. Y. S. 238 (1925).
" See 35 Yale L. J. 269-270.
'Cf. City of Logansport v. Kihm, 159 Ind. 68, 83 N. E. 632 (1902), and
discussion, in the article cited note 58, supra.
' See the cases cited in this section for forms of alleging the injury. Cf.
Jackson v. Pesked, 1 M. & S. 234 (1813). As to pleading damage, see p. 123
infra.
. Barker v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co., 91 Mo, 86 (1886) ; Radezky v. Sargent
& Co., 77 Conn. 110, 58 Atl. 709 (1904). Cf. Sharrow v. Inland Lines, 214 N.
Y. 101, 108 N. E. 217 (1915), L. R. A. 1915 E. 1192, with note. See p. 104
supra.
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in the ordinary highway injury case, the first paragraph of the
complaint very normally will fix the plaintiff's position on the high-
way, and the second paragraph will fix the defendant's position just
before the accident and the direction he was taking, and the third
will set forth the steps resulting in the collision and the injury. Suc-
ceeding paragraphs may allege the extent of the injury and other
items of damage.62
Generality of Allegations
While it has always been improper to allege merely that the
plaintiff's injury was due to the defendant's negligence, the common
law precedents sustain a form of pleading only a little less general
than that. Under the common law precedents it was customary to
state in fairly general form what the defendant's act was and char-
acterize it as negligent. Thus, in a complaint for injury on the high-
way the form of statement would be that the defendant so carelessly
drove his horse that through his carelessness the plaintiff was struck
and injured.6 3  Some modern authorities follow the same outline
and allow the same liberality.6 4 Others go quite to the other extreme
and say that such an allegation merely states a conclusion of law
and that it is necessary to state just what the particular acts of the
defendant were which are claimed to be negligent, as, for instance,
the speed at which he drove, the place on the highway, the failure to
keep a proper lookout, etc. 65 Still others hold the more general
form of allegation sufficient against the objection that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, but usually insufficient where the
'For forms, see e.g. Maxwell, Code Pl. 724; Conn. Pr. Bk. (1922) 452, and
other references in 32 Yale L. J. 483.
Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112 (1833); cf. 2 Chitty, 13 Am. ed. 707,
which in spite of repetition and verbosity contains no more definite allegations
than as indicated in the text. See the writer's comment, Pleading Negligence,
32 Yale L. J. 483.
Mass. Gen. L. 1921, ch. 231, sec. 147, no. 13; Conn. Prac. Bk. 1922, p.
452; Dunn v. Dufficy, 194 Cal. 383, 228 Pac. 1029 (1924) ; Dewhirst v. Leopold,
194 Cal. 424, 229 Pac. 30 (1924) ; Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 12 N. D.
343, 97 N. W. 535 (1903) ; Davis v. Drennan Co. Dept. Stores, 189 Ala. 683,
66 So. 642 (1915); McLeod v. Chicago etc. Ry., 65 Wash. 62, 117 Pac. 749
(1911) ; Deal v. U. S., 11 Fed. (2d) 3 (1926). See authorities in 32 Yale L
J. 48, note 12; 33 Yale L. J. 559.
Woodward v. 0. R. & N. Co., 18 Or. 289, 22 Pac. 1076 (1890) ; cf. Jones
v. Portland, 35 Or. 512, 58 Pac. 657 (1899) ; Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Wheeler's
Adm'r. 108 Va. 448, 62 S. E. 269 (1908); Silvia v. Scotten, 31, Del. 290, 114
Atl. 206 (1921) ; 33 Yale L. J. 559. For an extreme case, see Kramer v. Kas.
City Power & Lt. Co., Mo. 279 S. W. 43 (1925).
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defendant asks for a more particular statement.6 0 Perhaps the
greater number of cases at the present time tend to this latter posi-
tion. It may be doubted whether this even is not too strict. As we
have seen, the distinction between conclusions of law and statements
of fact is one really of degree.67 An accident involving negligence
happens so quickly and the various details must be testified to at such
a length of time afterwards by non-expert witnesses that it is harsh
to attempt to tie down either party to a particular conjunction of
circumstances as being the only one upon which he may rely. Very
often the time at which the occurrences took place is vitally important
and a difference of a second or 'two or a difference of a few feet in
the setting of the parties may make the greatest difference in the
legal situation. So long as the plaintiff is as sufficiently definite as
reasonably could be expected under the circumstances, it seems alto-
gether too strict to require him to pin himself down to more definite
allegation. As a matter of fact, he will decline to do this anyhow,,
since a good pleader, being forced to more particular statements,
will incorporate in his pleading long detailed allegations of any mat-
ters which by any possibility he may prove. This is especially true
as there is no penalty upon him for failure to prove those which he
alleges so long as he proves a single one.68 He thus protects himself
by an excess of detail which only serves the more to confuse and to
draw out the pleading. A sounder view, it is submitted, would be
to say that in general the common law form of allegation should be
sufficient. In certain cases where the defendant may show by affi-
davit that in the particular case under consideration he actually
cannot prepare his defense for lack of definite allegation, the court
would still have discretion to order a more particular statement, but
such statement should not be ordered on any theory of a general rule
of law but only where the court is really convinced that fairness
demands it in the particular case.69
'Couture v. Gauthier, 123 Me. 132, 122 Atl. 54 (1923); Van Bibber v.
Willman Fruit Co., Mo. 234 S. W. 356 (1922). See law review articles cited
notes 63-64 supra; and cases collected, Am. Dig. Neglige~ce, secs. 108, 111.
"See reference note 55 supra.
' Lathrop v. Frank Bud Transfer Co., 81 Ind. App. 549, 142 N. E. 868(1924) ; Soltesz v. Bels Provision Co., Mo. 260 S. W. 990 (1924) ; Nichols v.
Champion Fibre Co., 190 N. C. 1, 128 S. E. 471 (1925). Unless the acts are
alleged as concurring to produce the injury. Worinsdorf v. Detroit City R.
Co., 75 Mich. 472, 42 N. W. 1000 (1889) ; Soltesz v. Belz Provision Co., supra.
'32 Yale L. J. 483. At common law a motion for a bill of particulars was
supported by the defendant's affidavit, showing that a more specific statement
was necessary:, Johnson v. Birley, 5 B. & A. 540 (1822).
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It is usually stated that where specifications of negligence are
incorporated in the complaint, these control all general allegations so
that only the acts specified may be proven at the trial.70 The effect
of this strict rule may sometimes be somewhat avoided by putting
in the specifications of negligence, not as explanations of a general
allegation, but as further specified acts of which the more general
allegation is only the first.7 1
Contributory Negligence.
Under the substantive law of negligence we have the rule that
where the plaintiff is guilty of negligence contributing to the acci-
dent, he cannot recover. A question arises, must the plaintiff nega-
tive such negligence on his part in the complaint? The answer may
come somewhat from a logical analysis of the problem. If we say,
as some courts do, that where the plaintiff's negligence contributes
to the accident, the defendant's negligence cannot be said to be the
sole proximate cause, we may then consider that by alleging negli-
gence on the part of the defendant we have excluded the idea of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. On the other
hand, the doctrine may be considered a penalty which prevents a
person who is himself at fault from recovering. In this event, it is
quite possible to say that the defendant should himself raise the issue
if he wishes to take advantage of the fault. On the other hand, it
still might be said that since the plaintiff must show such freedom
from negligence as an operative fact, he has the burden of alleging
and showing it in the first instance. Due in part to this difference in
analysis of the underlying problem there seem to be at least three
rules of pleading as to contributory negligence which have 9upport
"N. E. Fruit & Produce Co. v. Hines, 97 Conn. 225, 235, 116 At. 243
(1922) ; Capell v. N. Y. Transp. Co., 150 A. D. 723, 135 N. Y. S. 906 (1912) ;
Waldhier v. Ry., 71 Mo. 514 (1880) ; Pogue v. Crunden-Martin Mfg. Co., Mo.
273 S. W. 782 (1925). But see Edgerton v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 39 N. Y. 227
(1868) ; Cunningham v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 4 Utah, 206, 7 Pac. 795 (1885).
'Thus a general charge of reckless driving on a highway, followed by a
paragraph specifyipg the manner in which the defendant was reckless, would
call for the application of the rule (see cases note 70 supra) ; but allegations
that the defendant was operating his car upon the highway in a negligent, care-
less and reckless manner and without keeping a proper lookout and without
sounding a horn, etc., may perhaps all be treated as of equal standing. This
seems to have been the case in Mezzi v. Taylor, 99 Conn. 1, 120 Atl. 871 (1923).
Since generality is only a question of degree, and since the distinction seems to
follow one in the pleader's own mind, the ruling seems not objectionable. Cf.
Traver v. Spokane St. Ry. Co., 25 Wash. 225, 65 Pac. 284 (1901), resting upon
the pleader's intent.
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in various jurisdictions-first, the plaintiff has the burden of show-
ing such freedom from contributory negligence but no express alle-
gation is necessary in the complaint since the charge that the action
was caused by the defendant's negligence in effect contains the other
allegation;72 second, the plaintiff has both the burden of alleging
and of proving freedom from contributory negligence;78 third, con-
tributory negligence is a defense to be alleged and proved by the
defendant.74 The third rule is sometimes embodied in a code
provision.7 5
Where the third view is followed some courts have raised the
question whether the defendant may both deny the plaintiff's alle-
gation of negligence and assert that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. It is asserted that the defendant must confess his own
" Greenberg v. Branciere, 100 Corn. 596, 124 Atl. 216 (1924) ; Lee v. Troy
Gas Co., 98 N. Y. 115 (1885) ; as to death cases, see note 75, infra; Fuller v.
Boston etc. R. R. Co., 133 Mass. 491 (1882) ; Benedict v. Union Agr. 1. Soc.,
74 Vt. 91, 52 Atl. 110 (1902); Potter v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 20 Wis. 533
(1866). A few jurisdictions hold that the burden of proof is on the defendant,
but the evidence is admissible under a general denial. Ry. Co. v. Darnell, 221
Fed. 191 (1915). This seems to be the rule in Wisconsin, Cunningham v.
Lyness, 22 Wis. 245 (1867); Sweetman v. Green Bay, 147 Wis. 586, 132 N. W.
1111 (1911) (but see Marshall, C. J., dis. that the burden of going forward
only is on the defendant).
Jamison v. Myrtle Lodge, 158 Ia. 264, 139 N. W. 547 (1915) ; Mich. etc.
R. R. Co. v. N. Y. R. Co., 29 Ind. 258, changed by statute, note 75 infra.
Buzzell v. Laconia Mfg. Co., 48 Me. 113 (1861); Thompson v. Flint etc. R.
Co., 57 Mich. 300, 23 N. W. 820 (1885) ; Guthrie v. Nix, 3 Okla. 136, 41 Pac.
343 (1895).
" Thompson v. North Mo. R. R. Co., 51 Mo. 190 (1873) ; Clark v. Ry., 28
Minn. 69 (1881) ; Paducah etc. R. Co. v. Hoehl, 12 Buck, Ky. 41 (1876). This
seems by far the more usual rule. See cases cited Shearman & Redfield, Negli-
gence, 6th ed., sec. 107, 108; 1 Thomp. Neg., sec. 366; 33 L. R. A., n.s. 1152;
Am. Dig., Negligence, sec. 113, 117. A general averment seems usually held
sufficient, except as against motion. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Wolfe, 80 Ky. 82
(1882) ; 3 Bates, New Pleading, 2302; but see Cogdell v. R. R. Co., 132 N. C.
852, 44 S. E. 618 (1903). Where the plaintiff anticipates the defense, the alle-
gation is usually held immaterial, not put in issue by a denial. Hudson v.
Wabash etc. R., 101 Mo. 13; Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Forrest, 73 Oh. St. 1,
75 N. E. 818 (1905). Contra, Hoblt v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 111 Minn. 77,
126 N. W. 407 (1910). See 1 Minn. L. R. 463; Bates, 2303. That the de-
fendant may take advantage of contributory negligenci, when clearly disclosed
by the plaintiff's own pleading or evidence, even if not pleaded, see State v.
Hallen, 165 Mo. App. 422, 146 S. W. 1171 (1912) ; Birsch v. Citizens Elec. Co.,
36 Mont. 574, 93 Pac. 940 (1908) ; cf. 1 Thompson, Neg. 2d. ed., sec. 369.
" Idaho, Comp. St. 1919, sec. 6721; Ind. Burn's Ann. St. 1914, sec. 362,
(applying to personal injury but not property damage suits, Phillips v. Jackson,
Ind. 147 N. E. 818 (1925) ; Engle v. C. C. & St. L. Ry Co. Ind. 149 N. E. 643
(1925); C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Tauer, 176 Ind. 621, 96 N. E. 758 (1911);
N. Y. C. P. A., sec. 265, applying only to actions for wrongful death, Davis v.
N. Y. St. Rys., 206 N. Y. S. 138 (1924) ; North Carolina, Consol. St. 1919,
sec. 523.
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negligence before he may allege negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
This is perhaps a logical argument but it is sacrificing the practical
necessities of the case to logic for it is often the case that the defend-
ant may be fairly in doubt as to whether the evidence will show free-
dom from negligence on his part or contributory negligence upon the
part of the plaintiff. It seems .unfair to require him to elect before
trial which of these grounds he shall stand upon.7 6
Assumption of Risk and Fellow-Servant Rule
Before the adoption of workmen's compensation acts generally,
the defenses of assumption of risk and the act of a fellow-servant
were important in suits by an employee against his employer for
negligent injury. Whether these matters were strictly defenses, or
the plaintiff was required to take notice of them in his complaint,
depended on similar questions of analysis-of substantive law to those
presented in the matter of contributory negligence. There was a
similar split in the authorities, although 'the same court did not
necessarily treat these matters as identical with contributory negli-
gence or with each other.77
" Generally the defense of contributory negligence is allowed with a denial
of negligence. Leavenworth Light Co. v. Waller, 65 Kan. 514, 70 Pac. 365(1902) reversing 9 Kan. App. 301, 61 Pac. 327; McMillan v. So. Ry., 54 S. C.
485, 32 S. E. 539 (1898); Kimble v. Stockpole, 60 Wash. 35, 110 Pac. 677(1910) ; Elliott Jobbing Co. v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 136 Minn. 138, 161 N. W.
390 (1917). It has been said, however, that the plea of contributory negli-
gence, being a plea in confession and avoidance, must necessarily admit negli-
gence on the defendant's part, and hence it is inconsistent with a denial. Cinn.
Traction Co. v. Stephens, 75 Oh. St. 171, 178, 79 N. E. 235 (1906). Cf. 5
Encyc. P1. Prac. 10, 11. In Elliott Jobbing Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co., supra, an
allegation that an injury was due solely to plaintiff's negligence was held in
effect a plea of contributory negligence. Perhaps the majority of courts say.
however, that such a plea does not admit the defendant's negligence, it is another
and an unnecessary way of denying defendant's negligence and adds nothing to
a denial. Watkinds v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. 711 (1889); Kamp v. Metrop.
St. Ry. Co., 133 Mo. App. 700, 114 S. W. 59 (1908); Birsch v. Citizens Elec.
Co., 36 Mont. 574, 93 Pac. 940 (1908) ; Cogdell v. R. R. Co., note 74, supra;
Thayer v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 21 N. M. 330, 1544 Pac. 691 (1916). The
reasoning of the Elliott case disregarding strict logic for practical convenience
seems commendable; 1 Minn. L. R. 463.
'
t Assumption of risk must be specially pleaded by the defendant. Duffy v.
Consolidated Coal Co., 147 Ia. 225, 124 N. W. 609 (1910) ; Lloyd v. Southern
Ry. Co., 166 N. C. 24, 81. S. E. 1003 (1914). Aff'd. 239 U. S. 496, 60 L. Ed.
402 (1916). Contra, Multnomah Co. v. Willamette Touring Co., 49 Ore. 204,
89 Pac. 389 (1907); Buzzell v. Laconia Mfg. Co., note 73 supra; Evans
Laundry Co. v. Crawford, 67 Neb. 153, 93 N. W. 177 (1903). Act of a fellow
servant must be specially pleaded by the defendant. Laying v. Mt. Shasta
Muncie Spring Co., 135 Cal. 141, 67 Pac. 48 (1901) ; Longpre v. Big Blackfoot
Milling Co., 38 Mont. 99, 99 Pac. 131 (1909); Duff v. Willamette Street
Works, 45 Ore. 479, 78 Pac. 363, 668 (1904). Contra, Kaminski v. Tudor Iron
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Last Clear Chance
Where the plaintiff wishes to rely upon the so-called last clear
chance or humanitarian doctrine, namely, upon the claim that even if
he were negligent, the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident and is therefore the proximate cause of it, a question arises
whether the plaintiff must allege these facts in detail Some courts
have even gone so far as to say that unless the plaintiff confesses his
own negligence, he cannot set up the last clear chance doctrine. This
is a ruling similar to that criticized with reference to the defendant's
position in pleading contributory negligence. It is unfairly requiring
the plaintiff to choose between two situations as to which he may be
honestly in doubt in advance of the trial.78 An allegation which sets
forth that the defendant is the proximate cause of the accident
should be held sufficiently general so that under it the plaintiff could
show that this was the case, either because of the defendant's sole
negligence or because of the defendant's supervening negligence.
Any other rule requires an unfair particularity of allegation con-
cerning events which happen very quickly and as to the exact order
of which the plaintiff may be fairly in doubt until the evidence is
all in.79
Wilful Negligence and Res Ipsa Loquitur
On similar principles an allegation of "wilful negligence" so-
called, that is, wanton injury as to which contributory negligence is
not a defense, should be permitted at the same time that the pleader
asserts ordinary negligence. In fact the better rule seems to be that
one alleging wilful negligence may recover upon proof of ordinary
negligence only.80 So also the question is raised whether a plaintiff,
Works, 167 Mo. 462, 67 S. W. 221 (1901) ; Roberts v. Virginia-Carolina Chem.
Co., 84 S. C. 283, 66 S. E. 298 (1909); Sayward v. Carlson, 1 Wash. 29, 23
Pac. 830 (1890). See cases cited Am. Dig., Master and Servant, sec. 262.
" Cf. cases on contributory negligence, note 76 supra.
Special allegations necessary; Emmons v. So. Pac. Co., 97 Ore. 263, 191
Pac. 333 (1920); Drown v. No. Ohio T. Co., 76 Oh. St. 234, 81 N. E. 326(1907) ; Houston v. Mo. etc. Ry., 36 Tex. Civ. App. 633, 83 S. W. 52 (1904).
Contra, Mezzi v. Taylor, 99 Conn. 1, 120 Atl. 871 (1923) (even though plaintiff
pleads lack of contributory negligence) ; Johnson v. Springfield Traction Co.,
176 Mo. App. 174, 161 S. W. 1193 (1914); Welch v. Fargo & M. St. Ry. Co.,
24 N. D. 463, 140 N. W. 680 (1914); Ky. Traction etc. Co. v. Wilburn, 206
Ky. 510, 267 S. W. 1090 (1925). Cf. Meloner v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Mont.
162, 127 Pac. 146 (1912) ; Newsome v. L. & N. R. Co., Ala. 102 So. 61 (1925)
(under general count) ; Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482
(1924).
"Sanders v. Hayes, 128 S. C. 181, 122 S. E. 572 (1924) ; 1 Thompson, Neg.,
2d ed., sec. 383; cf. Anderson v. Minneapolis etc. Ry., 103 Minn. 224, 114 N.
W. 1123 (1908).
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who has asserted specific acts of negligence upon the part of the
defendant, may rely upon the general presumption of negligence in
circumstances where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
There is a definite division of opinion in the cases, but in accordance
with the general view above expressed that it is unfair to insist upon
a minute specification of facts in this class of cases, it is suggested
that the question should be answered in the affirmative.8 '
Damages
Since injury to the plaintiff or his property is an essential opera-
tive fact to a cause of action for negligence, such injury must be set
forth. Where that is shown, the law will presume general damages
to follow, to use the ordinary expression of the court. Special
damages must be specifically alleged. The rules governing the matter
of alleging damage are discussed hereinafter.
(To BE CONCLUDED)
'iRes ipsa loquitur inapplicable where specific negligence pleaded. Bogreess
v. Wabash Ry. Co., Mo. 266 S. W. 333 (1924); Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v.
Helms, Tex. 261 S. W. 225 (1924). Contra, Firszt v. Capitol Pk. Realty Co.,
98 Conn. 627, 120 Atl. 300 (1923) ; Walters v. Seattle etc. Ry., 48 Wash. 233,
93 Pac. 419 (1908) ; Biddle v. Riley, 118 Ark. 206, 176 S. W. 134 (1915). See
L. R. A. 1915 F. 992, note; 24 L. R. A., n. s., 788, note; So. Fac. Co. v. Han-
Ion, 9 Fed. (2d) 293 (1926) ; B. & 0. S. W. R. Co. v. Hill, Ind. 148 N. E.
489 (1925) ; Kaemmerling v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 2 Fed. (2d) 574
(1924).
